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A B S T R A C T
Decision-making groups decide on many numerical issues, which makes them potentially vulnerable to cognitive
anchors. In the current study we investigated (1) whether the anchoring-bias operates in groups, (2) under which
circumstances group anchoring is more or less likely to occur and (3) which processes underlie the anchoring-
bias in groups. In three group decision-making studies we found that cooperative groups were susceptible to
anchors. However, the anchoring-bias in groups was mitigated when groups were made process accountable or
competitively motivated. Finally, we investigated whether the anchoring bias in groups operated through a fast
and early influence on individual preferences, or through biased information exchange. We found evidence for
the former process, but not for the latter.
1. The anchoring-bias in groups
Trial parties ask for punitive damages, negotiation teams invest in
developing their outside alternatives and benchmarks, corporate in-
vestment boards know what rival companies invested, and selection
committees remember the test-score of the previous candidate. In all
these cases groups are confronted with anchors – numerical values that
can influence and bias subsequent judgments (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). While the biasing effects of anchors on individual decision ma-
kers have been demonstrated repeatedly (Furnham & Boo, 2011), little
is known about when anchors influence group decision-making. Indeed,
although earlier work suggests that groups will be influenced by an-
chors, three key issues remain unresolved. First, little is known about
conditions that amplify or mitigate possible anchoring-bias in groups.
Second, we have little insight into which processes underlie anchoring
in groups and third, there is limited insight into whether groups are
more or less biased by anchoring than individual decision makers. Here
we address these voids with three group decision-making experiments
that reveal whether and how anchoring-bias operates in groups and
influences group judgment and decision-making.
1.1. The anchoring-bias
When people make judgments or estimates about an uncertain si-
tuation they tend to rely on initial, salient values, impressions, or pieces
of information – often called “anchors” (Epley & Gilovich, 2010;
Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In one now
seminal study, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of
African countries in the United Nations. Participants receiving a low
anchor (10%) estimated 25%, while those receiving a high anchor
(65%) estimated 45% (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring has
proven to be a pervasive judgmental bias affecting novices and experts
alike (Loschelder, Friese, Schaerer, & Galinsky, 2016). For example,
anchors affect purchase quantity decisions (Wansink, Kent, & Hoch,
1998), concession making in negotiations (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel,
2000; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Loschelder, Trötschel, Swaab,
Friese, & Galinsky, 2016), performance judgments (Thorsteinson,
Breier, Atwell, Hamilton, & Privette, 2008), credit card repayments
(Stewart, 2009), and real estate agents' housing price estimates
(Northcraft & Neale, 1987). The anchoring effect thus is not only a
robust psychological phenomenon (Klein et al., 2014), it also affects
individual judgment and decision-making in a broad range of settings
and situations.
Anchoring influences individuals for several reasons. The Selective
Accessibility Model (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 2000; Strack et al.,
1997), explains anchoring effects in terms of confirmatory hypotheses
testing. For example, when individuals are asked if Gandhi lived longer
or shorter than 120 years, they tend to engage in confirmatory hy-
pothesis testing (e.g., searching for information supporting Gandhi's old
age), which can be more or less thorough and effortful (Chapman &
Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001; Wegener, Petty,
Blankenship, & Detweiler-Bedell, 2010). During this process of con-
firmatory hypothesis testing, anchor-consistent knowledge becomes
activated (e.g., Gandhi grew very old) even when one knows that
Gandhi did not reach the age of 120 (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005), and
this information influences the final judgment (see Brewer & Chapman,
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2002). Alternatively, the anchoring-bias is explained by insufficient
adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). According to this theory
anchors are a starting point for one's estimation process. People then
adjust too little because they stop adjusting when they reach a plausible
value (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Furnham & Boo, 2011).
Although some debate exists on whether the anchoring-bias is ex-
plained by selective accessibility, insufficient adjustment (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), or both (Chaxel, 2014; Simmons, LeBoeuf, & Nelson,
2010), evidence has accumulated for the idea that selective accessibility
operates especially for externally generated anchors, such as anchors
provided by third parties such as experimenters or organizational lea-
ders (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2010; Furnham & Boo,
2011). In the present studies externally provided anchors were in-
vestigated, rendering selective accessibility the more important me-
chanism for individual-level anchoring during group decision-making.
1.2. The anchoring bias in group decision-making
Groups are often assumed to be less biased, more rational, and to
make better decisions than individuals (Tindale, Kameda, & Hinsz,
2003). Across the board however, there is mixed evidence for this claim
(Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996; Kerr &
Tindale, 2004; Laughlin, Bonner, & Altermatt, 1998; Laughlin,
VanderStoep, & Hollingshead, 1991; Sunstein, 2004; Whyte, 1993).
Although groups tend to perform equal or better than their best member
on intellectual tasks that have a demonstrably correct answer and high
information load (Laughlin et al., 1998, 1991), often they appear to be
as biased as, or even more biased than, individuals operating alone and
independently (Kerr et al., 1996; Kerr & Tindale, 2004).
Suboptimal group outcomes are due to (combinations of) biased
information-driven and preference-driven processes (De Dreu, Nijstad,
& Van Knippenberg, 2008; Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983; Schulz-
Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006; Stasser &
Birchmeier, 2003; Winquist & Larson, 1998). Information-driven deci-
sions occur when members seek, communicate, and integrate relevant
information and arguments. Yet information is typically shared selec-
tively and processed in a biased fashion. For example, group members
give more weight to their own information and to common information,
than to other members' information, and information that is less
common (De Dreu et al., 2008; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006; Stasser &
Titus, 1985, 1987). Consequently, when group members' individual
knowledge and information is biased, group discussion amplifies initial
bias and the quality of group decision-making suffers substantially.
Preference-driven decisions occur when members take stock of the
current preferences in the group and weight and aggregate these pre-
ferences. Typically, group members pool preferences early on in the
decision process, and tend to settle for either the majority or the median
preference (Davis, 1973, 1996; Laughlin & Earley, 1982; Schulz-Hardt
et al., 2006). Accordingly, the more individual preferences within a
group are biased, the more biased the group decision-making will be.
Indeed, in a study by Whyte and Sebenius (1997) participants received
an individual anchor before any group interaction took place and when
they were put together in groups, the pooling of their biased individual
preferences resulted in group decisions that were influenced in the di-
rection of the individual anchors given before group discussion.
The initial evidence for group decisions being influenced by anchors
notwithstanding, several issues remain elusive. Specifically, existing
work leaves unanswered whether and when anchors presented at the
group level affect the group's decision. Indeed, previous work did not
show that groups collectively are vulnerable for the use of an anchor,
but rather showed that individually anchored persons influence groups
decisions by pooling their respective estimates. There are two reasons
to assume that the anchoring-bias in groups could be different from the
individual-level anchoring-bias.
First, previous work suggests that groups have a tendency to ignore
or reject outside information, which could apply to a group-level
anchor as well. For example, work on advice utilization showed that
when groups of individuals interact to reach a joint decision, they tend
to be more confident in their own estimates, which led them to utilize
advice to a lesser extent than individuals deciding alone (Minson &
Mueller, 2012, 2013; Schultze, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2013). Be-
cause anchoring effects seem to be mitigated by confidence (Jacowitz &
Kahneman, 1995) and groups indeed tend to be more confident than
individuals (Patalano & LeClair, 2011), one might expect groups to be
less influenced by the anchoring bias when the anchor is presented at
the group-level.
Second, unlike in the study by Whyte and Sebenius (1997), when
individual preferences are not biased by an anchor prior to group dis-
cussion, multiple different anchors (i.e. personal preferences) might
enter the discussion space. For example, trial judges deal with both the
prosecution's demand (an external anchor) and the sentencing pre-
ferences held by each individual judge. According to the ‘competing
anchors hypothesis', when individually generated anchors compete
with the external anchor, it renders the latter less influential (Sniezek,
1992; Whyte & Sebenius, 1997). Indeed, Switzer and Sniezek (1991)
found that individuals' performance predictions were less biased by an
arbitrary, externally determined goal when a contradictory relevant
anchor was introduced, such as others' performance (see also Galinsky
& Mussweiler, 2001; Schaerer, Loschelder, & Swaab, 2016; Schaerer,
Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015). Thus, decision makers appear to give more
weight to cues or anchors deemed more relevant, which might mean
that externally provided anchors are less influential when self-gener-
ated anchors are present, like group members' individual pre-anchor
preferences.
1.3. Overview
In sum, theory and research on group judgment and decision-
making suggests that groups tend to be sensitive for judgmental biases,
and this should also hold for the anchoring-bias. However, work on
advice, confidence and competing anchors suggest that groups might be
less affected by anchors. To establish whether the anchoring-bias op-
erates in groups, in an initial study we compared groups presented with
a low versus high anchor. In Studies 2 and 3, we tested conditions that
amplify or mitigate possible anchoring-bias in groups, and the processes
that underlie anchoring in groups.
2. Method study 1
2.1. Design and participants
Participants (N=72 graduate and undergraduate students; 23 men;
M=22.62 years, SD=4.70 years) were randomly assembled in
twenty-four 3-person groups; groups were then randomly assigned to a
low or high anchor condition. Sample size was based on a large re-
plication project (Klein et al., 2014) in which five classic anchoring
studies were replicated 36 times, which revealed an average median
effect-sizes of d=1.87. Using this effect-size, an independent t-test
with 80% power requires a total sample size of 12. Because these effects
pertain to individuals rather than groups, we doubled sample size to 24
groups. The study was approved by the local Psychology Research In-
stitute Ethics Review Board and participants provided informed-con-
sent. They were compensated with course-credit or €3.50.
2.2. Procedure and decision-making task
Upon entering the laboratory, three participants forming one group
were seated behind a table, separated by wooden partitions, which
prevented them from seeing each other's answers but allowed them to
see each other. After individually filling out a short demographics
questionnaire, and when all group members were ready, participants
received a realistic 7-page criminal case about an alleged rape and were
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given 15min to examine the materials individually and without com-
munication. The case resembled the materials described in Mussweiler
and Englich (2005), and was formulated in such a way that participants
would agree on the defendant's guilt. This would ensure that partici-
pants would also determine a prison sentence. The case, including
statements from all parties and expert opinions, described that Mark W.
and Anne L. went out for drinks with colleagues. They flirted, leading
Anne to miss her bus and Mark offering to give her a ride home. Instead
of bringing her home he took her to a deserted meadow, where he
forced himself onto her. In a pretest of the materials (N=38) only one
participant declared the defendant not guilty and five reported they did
not know.
After reading the case, participants individually and without con-
sulting others noted their personal sentencing preference. Next, the
wooden partitions were removed and groups received the prosecutor's
demand (see “Manipulation of Anchor”). Group members were allowed
to communicate about the guilt of the defendant and were asked to
collaboratively reach a joint sentencing judgment. After reaching a
sentencing judgment, the wooden partitions were replaced and all
participants alone and without communication answered several ad-
ditional questions about their decision (see Online Supplementary
Information). Hereafter, participants were thanked, debriefed and re-
ceived their credit or payment.
2.3. Manipulation of anchor
Importantly, the anchor was presented at the group level, rather
than presented to individuals separately (contrary to Whyte & Sebenius,
1997). Each group drew one lot from a bowl, which was told to contain
the numbers 1 to 100 (see Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006 for a
similar procedure using loaded dice). The lot represented the prosecu-
tor's demand (e.g., lot 25 meant a 25month sentencing demand). Un-
known to participants, the bowl only contained the numbers 6 (low
anchor) or 61 (high anchor). These anchor values were determined
based on a pretest in which 37 individuals read the case and indicated a
sentencing judgments (M=27.76months, SD=34.10), and roughly
corresponded with the 10th and 90th percentile of the sentences gen-
erated without any anchor being given.
2.4. Dependent variable
2.4.1. Sentencing judgment
Our dependent variable was the group's sentence (in months). We
also noted individual preferences both prior to and following group
decision-making.
2.4.2. Auxiliary measures
In addition we measured the extent group members experienced
decision certainty and difficulty and the agreement with the group
choice. These measures – and any other additional measures we ex-
amined in Study 2 and 3 – are reported in the Supplementary Materials.
2.5. Analyses
In all three studies, analyses on group sentencing judgments have
been performed on square-root transformed variables. Means, standard
deviations and standard errors of these transformed sentencing judg-
ments are shown in Table S1 (Supplementary Information).
Untransformed means and standard deviations are reported in the main
paper.
Variables pertaining to group processes (information, preference
exchange and sentencing decisions) are analyzed at the group level.
However, individual-level variables (e.g., decision certainty, agreement
etc.) are analyzed using Mixed-Model Analyses that include a random-
intercept to account for group membership. In these analyses the de-
grees of freedom are adjusted depending on how much variance is
explained by group membership. When group membership explains
much variance, the test, and its concomitant degrees of freedom, will be
equal to a group-level test, and when the random intercept is redundant
the test will be equal to an individual level test.
3. Results
3.1. Data preparation
There were no differences in sex, χ2(1)= 2.56, p= .110 and age, t
(69)=−1.13, p= .263 between conditions. As expected, group
members' individual (pre-anchor) sentencing judgments did not differ
between low anchor groups (M=23.53, SD=17.79) and high anchor
groups (M=26.77, SD=24.87), t(69)=−0.43, p= .672. Since the
sentencing preferences were skewed (in all three studies) we analyzed
results on the basis of square root transformed sentences. When this
yielded different results than the untransformed variable this is noted in
the text. For ease of interpretation untransformed means are presented
(see Supplementary Information for transformed means).
3.2. Sentencing judgment
An independent samples t-test showed that groups gave higher
punishments in the high anchor condition (M=30.67, SD=14.87)
than in the low anchor condition (M=18.38, SD=10.54), t
(21.84)= 2.38, p= .027, r= 0.43, d= 0.97.1 Although this effect-size
was smaller than found by Klein et al. (2014) in individual decision-
making, the effect of anchors on group decision-making appears sub-
stantial.
4. Discussion and introduction to study 2
Study 1 provided initial evidence that anchors influence decision-
making in groups. Interestingly, the externally provided anchor has to
compete with the preferences of three group members, and, as also
argued by others (Switzer & Sniezek, 1991), these preferences can be
seen as multiple anchors. Thus, our study shows that external anchors
can have an impact on group judgments over and beyond the impact of
individual preferences.
Study 1 provided little information about the possible mechanisms
that explain why groups fall prey to anchoring. As mentioned pre-
viously, biased or flawed decision-making can be explained by (com-
binations of) preference-driven and information-driven processes.
According to the Selective Accessibility Model (Strack et al., 1997)
anchors can influence people's judgments fast, and outside of their
awareness. This suggests that group members' preferences might ra-
pidly shift towards the anchor. When these biased preferences are
further pooled during discussion, the group's decision is likely to be
biased in the same direction, because groups tend to combine numerical
preferences by averaging them, or by adopting the median preference
(Davis, 1996; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). Alternatively, when individual
preferences remain unbiased, the group's judgment is likely to be un-
biased too.
In addition to these preference-driven processes, anchors can affect
judgments through information-driven processes, by making anchor-
consistent information more accessible (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999;
Strack et al., 1997). Applied to Study 1’s criminal case, incriminating
arguments might thus have become more accessible when groups were
presented with a high anchor, versus exonerating arguments when
groups were presented with a low anchor, thereby biasing information
exchange. Thus, group judgments might be influenced by anchors
1 The effect of Anchor remained significant when we controlled for individual pre-
anchor preferences. Thus, the anchor explained variance above and beyond individual
preferences. Controlling for pre-anchor preferences in Study 2 and 3 also did not alter our
conclusions.
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because groups focus on information that is consistent with the anchor.
Both preference-driven and information-driven processes under-
lying anchoring should be conditional on the extent to which group
members are motivated to engage in thorough, deep information pro-
cessing. In Study 2 we examined this possibility by manipulating pro-
cess accountability—participants were evaluated (or not, in the control
condition) by others with unknown preferences and ideas about what
constitutes a good decision and process (De Dreu et al., 2008; Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992). Extant work has shown that process
accountability makes group members more self-critical and, therefore,
elicits more thorough investigation of information. Accordingly, group
members that are made process accountable engage in more unbiased
information search (Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, 2010) and are
more likely to use and process all available information (Scholten, van
Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007). In addition, under high pro-
cess accountability groups are more likely to defer their decision
(Nijstad & Oltmanns, 2012). Process accountable group members are
less willing to accept an alternative that they do not fully support and
are therefore less likely to quickly change their opinion (Davis, Stasser,
Spitzer, & Holt, 1976). As a result, we predicted that groups under
process accountability will be less influenced by anchors (Hypothesis
1), and that preference-driven processes are less biased in the direction
of the anchor (Hypothesis 2a), which in turn predicts the extent of the
anchoring-bias (Hypothesis 2b). With regards to information-driven
processes we expect that process accountable groups focus more on
unbiased, anchor inconsistent information (and thus less on biased,
consistent information) than control groups (Hypothesis 3a), which in
turn predicts the extent of the anchoring-bias (Hypothesis 3b).
5. Method
5.1. Design and participants
The experiment used a 2 (Anchor: High vs. Low)×2 (Process
Accountability: Absent vs. Present) design in which participants, in 90
groups of three, were randomly assigned to conditions. The study was
approved by the local Psychology Research Institute Ethics Review
Board and participants gave informed consent. Participants (N= 270,
M=21.67 years, SD=2.80 years; 192 women) received course-credit
or €10 for their participation. Compared to Study 1 we raised the
sample size per cell, which made our sample considerably larger than
related studies on process accountability in groups (Nijstad & Oltmanns,
2012; N=10 per cell; Scholten et al., 2007; N=14 per cell).
5.2. Procedure and decision-making task
We used the same case as in Study 1, and the procedure was similar.
Participants were seated in separate cubicles in which they read the
case, and individually determined the defendant's guilt and sentence.
Next, we manipulated groups' process accountability and the three
group members were seated together in one room. The experimenter
presented the anchor, as was done in Study 1, and the group de-
liberated. When finished, groups entered their decision in the computer
and returned to their individual cubicles to answer several questions
about the deliberation process and to receive a debriefing and their
compensation.
5.3. Manipulation of anchor
The anchors were determined by using the 10th and 90th percentile
from the initial, individual pre-anchor sentences from the first study,
and were therefore set at 5months (low anchor) and 61months (high
anchor).
5.4. Manipulation of process accountability
Process accountability was manipulated following an established
procedure (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Nijstad & Oltmanns, 2012;
Scholten et al., 2007; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Participants in the
process accountability condition received a memo stating that the re-
searchers would like to schedule a follow-up interview about the de-
cision-making task, to gain valuable insights in the way groups reach
decisions. During the interview a decision-making expert would ask
them about the decision-making process in the group. The memo em-
phasized that participants should be prepared to explain how their
group reached their decision, rather than what that decision was (out-
come-accountability; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Participants indicated
when they would be available for the interview. Participants in the no-
accountability condition did not receive this memo. Groups were in-
structed to try to reach a joint decision that reflected all group mem-
bers' preferences.
5.5. Dependent variables
The group sentencing judgment (in months) was our main depen-
dent variable. To examine whether process accountability enhanced
motivation to engage in deep and thorough information processing,
participants answered seven questions about their willingness to ela-
borate on their own ideas and viewpoints during the discussion
(1= completely disagree to 7= completely agree). Example items are: “I
always listened carefully to what my group members said”, “I tried to
make my decision in a thorough and balanced way”, and “To not im-
pede the progress of the discussion I sometimes supported things, even
though I did not really agree” (reverse coded; Cronbach's α=0.80). As
an instruction check, participants rated their agreement with the fol-
lowing statement: “After this study I will need to give an account of the
way we made our decision” (1= completely disagree to 7= completely
agree).
5.5.1. Preference-driven communication
All group deliberations were audio-recorded. To analyze preference-
driven communication, we examined group members' ‘first offer’,
which was defined as the first sentencing preference group members
mentioned that expressed their personal preference (unlike, for in-
stance, repeating someone else's preference). We examined first offers
in order to test our expectation that process accountable groups ex-
change first offers that are less biased in the direction of the anchor
(Hypothesis 2a), which predicts the extent of the anchoring-bias
(Hypothesis 2b).
The three members' first offers were averaged. We were particularly
interested in the first offers because early preference exchange has a
large influence on subsequent group interaction (see Schulz-Hardt
et al., 2006). In addition, first offers should capture early anchor in-
fluence in absence of much information exchange (see Schaerer et al.,
2015). From the audio recordings we retrieved the first offer from each
group member, and the time at which all group members had made
their offer.
5.5.2. Information-driven communication
From the audio recordings, we collected arguments that were ex-
changed while determining the defendant's sentence. The list of po-
tential arguments was based on a pilot study (N= 38) where partici-
pants wrote down as many incriminating and exonerating arguments,
based on the case materials. This led to a list of thirteen unique in-
criminating arguments and nine exonerating arguments, which were
coded as anchor (in) consistent, depending on anchoring condition.
Anchor consistent was defined as incriminating arguments when the
anchor was high, and exonerating arguments when the anchor was low,
and vice versa for anchor-inconsistent arguments. Our indicator of in-
formation-driven communication was the proportion of anchor-
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consistent/inconsistent arguments. Together, these two variables re-
present 100% of information exchange. This approach fits with earlier
work on anchoring in the legal domain, showing that incriminating
arguments became more accessible with a high anchor, and exonerating
information became more accessible with a low anchor, as evidenced
by a categorization task (Englich et al., 2006).
6. Results
6.1. Data preparation
One group erroneously did not receive an anchor and therefore had
to be excluded from the analyses. Analyses were thus performed on the
remaining 89 groups. In two groups, audio recordings failed and could
therefore not be included in analyses of the variables derived from
audio-recordings. There were no differences between conditions on sex
composition, χ2(3)= 0.27, p= .965 and age, F(3,263)= 0.17,
p= .914, nor on individual pre-anchor sentences, F(3, 261)= 1.55,
p= .201, ɳp2= 0.018.
6.2. Manipulation check
Results of a 2 (Anchor: High vs. Low)×2 (Process Accountability:
Absent vs. Present) Mixed-Model analyses (including a random inter-
cept to account for group membership) on the instruction check re-
vealed the expected main effect of Process Accountability, F(1,
263)= 86.74, p < .001, ɳp2= 0.248, with group members under
process accountability scoring higher (M=5.48, SD=1.56) than
control group members (M=3.53, SD=1.83). Process accountability
also enhanced group members' motivation to thoroughly process in-
formation as indicated by the 7-item questionnaire, F(1,85)= 4.89,
p= .030, ɳp2= 0.054. Group members under process accountability
were more willing to elaborate on their ideas (M=5.66, SD=0.46)
than members of control groups (M=5.39, SD=0.68).
6.3. Group sentence (Hypothesis 1)
A 2 (Anchor: High versus Low)×2 (Process Accountability: Absent
vs. Present) ANOVA showed no main effect of Process Accountability, F
(1,85)=0.76, p=.387, but a significant main effect of Anchor, F
(1,85)=5.25, p=.024, ɳp2=0.058, indicating that overall, a high an-
chor resulted in higher sentences (M=38.51, SD=21.23) than a low
anchor (M=29.59, SD=23.75). This effect was qualified by the ex-
pected interaction between Anchor and Process Accountability, F
(1,85)=6.31, p=.014, ɳp2=0.069 (Fig. 1A). The interaction is driven
by the much higher sentences in the low anchor/process accountable
condition. Indeed, simple effects showed that in the control condition, the
low anchor groups gave significantly lower sentences (M=21.64,
SD=14.50) than the high anchor groups (M=41.74, SD=20.76), F
(1,85)=11.66, p=.001, ɳp2=0.121. However, under process ac-
countability, there was no difference between high (M=35.14,
SD=21.67) and low anchor groups (M=37.55, SD=28.49), F
(1,85)=0.02, p=.877. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported.
6.4. Process analyses
6.4.1. Preference-driven communication (Hypotheses 2a,b)
Overall, first-offer preferences were pooled within 17.97%
(SD=17.94%) of the group's discussion time. To test Hypothesis 2a, we
examined whether the interaction between Anchor and Process
Accountability influenced first offers. A 2× 2 ANOVA on the average
first offer revealed a main effect of Anchor, F(1,83)= 3.28, p= .074,
ɳp2= 0.038 (marginal), showing that groups in the low anchor condi-
tion expressed lower first offers (M=28.26, SD=16.00) than groups
in the high anchor condition (M=36.81, SD=25.40). This effect was
qualified by the expected interaction with Process Accountability, F
(1,83)= 4.32, p= .041, ɳp2= 0.050. Simple effects showed the same
pattern as for group sentences: Control groups expressed lower first
offers with a low anchor (M=25.45, SD=13.62) than with a high
anchor (M=42.56, SD=28.17), F(1,83)= 7.65, p= .007,
ɳp2= 0.084. Process accountable groups, on the other hand, expressed
similar first offers with high (M=31.06, SD=21.39) and low anchors
(M=31.21, SD=18.04), F(1,83)= 0.04, p= .850. These results
confirmed Hypothesis 2a.
Moderated mediation analyses showed that the indirect effect
(−1.29, SE=0.60) of the Anchor and Accountability interaction
through first offers is larger than zero, as estimated by a 95% bias
corrected bootstrapped confidence interval based on 10.000 samples,
CI95:−2.48−0.10 (Hayes, 2013, Model 8; see Fig. 2). These results are
consistent with the idea that preference exchange is a driving factor
behind the anchoring effect in groups and are in support with Hy-
pothesis 2b.
6.4.2. Information-driven communication (Hypotheses 3a,b)
Supporting Hypothesis 3a, Process Accountability groups were more
focused on anchor-inconsistent arguments (M=0.52, SD=0.24), than
control groups (M=0.44, SD=0.20), F(1,81)= 5.37, p= .023,
ɳp2= 0.062. In addition, but unexpected, the extent to which groups
focused on anchor inconsistent arguments was influenced by the an-
chor, F(1,81)= 32.60, p < .001, ɳp2= 0.287 (two groups did not ex-
change any arguments (only preferences), resulting in N=85). When
presented with a high anchor, groups showed less focus on anchor in-
consistent arguments (M=0.36, SD=0.17), than when presented with
a low anchor (M=0.60, SD=0.22). Finally, the interaction between
anchor and process accountability was not significant, F(1,81)= 0.56,
p= .456.
Fig. 1. Sentencing judgments. (A) control and process accountable groups in Study 2; (B)
cooperative and competitive groups in Study 3. Displayed M ± SE. * significant differ-
ence at p < .05.
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In contrast to Hypothesis 3b, moderated mediation analyses showed
that the indirect effect (−0.31, SE=0.26) of the Anchor X
Accountability interaction through anchor inconsistent information was
not larger than zero, as estimated by a 95% bias corrected bootstrapped
confidence interval based on 10.000 samples, CI95: −1.10 0.25. Thus,
process accountable groups' information exchange did not explain their
lower susceptibility to the anchoring-bias.
7. Discussion and introduction to study 3
Study 1 showed that groups are vulnerable for the anchoring-bias.
Study 2 replicated this effect but additionally showed that this vul-
nerability is limited to groups that are not process accountable.
Interestingly, information-driven processes did not explain this differ-
ential susceptibility for anchors. Yet, preference-driven processes did:
Under process accountability the first exchanged preferences remained
unbiased by the anchor, while in control groups these preferences
shifted towards the anchor.
Process accountability was manipulated to create variation in the
depth and thoroughness of information processing at both the in-
dividual and group-level. Indeed, group members under process ac-
countability reported stronger motivation to process information and
in their first offers were not influenced by the anchor given to them
(in contrast to those in the control condition, whose first offers were
influenced by the anchor). Finally, group members under process
accountability were more focused on anchor-inconsistent arguments,
reflecting more even-handed group deliberation. Whereas these re-
sults fit the idea that process accountability raises motivation to
thoroughly process information (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, &
Euwema, 2006; De Dreu et al., 2008; Scholten et al., 2007), in the
specific context of the current group task, process accountability may
not only raised the amount and even-handedness of information
processing and exchange, but also changed the extent to which an
arbitrary starting point is used, something that is indeed difficult to
justify to outsiders. It would be interesting to examine, in new re-
search, whether process accountability indeed makes people more or
less susceptible to outside information that is arbitrary or, instead, of
clear relevance and meaning.
The first two studies are limited in the sense that they followed a set-
up typical for most group-decision-making studies, in that group
members were instructed to reach a joint decision, without any in-
structions or incentives to behave in a self-focused way. However, many
group decision-making settings are characterized by competitive mo-
tives that may counter the cooperative motive to reach a consensual
group decision (Beersma & De Dreu, 2005; De Dreu et al., 2008; Toma &
Butera, 2009; Toma, Vasiljevic, Oberlé, & Butera, 2013; Wittenbaum,
Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004). For example, in many organizations
employees work together in teams, while the reward structure is based
on individual relative performance (Hackman, 1998; Stanne, Johnson,
& Johnson, 1999). Thus, the best performing employees are rewarded
(competition), even though the task demands them to work together
with those same colleagues (cooperation). There are three important
aspects of competition that could have consequence for the occurrence
of the anchoring-bias.
First of all, competitive individuals are predominantly focused on
their own preferences and outcomes (De Dreu et al., 2008; Toma &
Butera, 2009; Toma, Vasiljevic, et al., 2013) and are less likely than
cooperative people to compromise (De Dreu et al., 2006; De Dreu,
Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Second, competitive settings make decision-
makers experience ownership over personal ideas, arguments and pre-
ferences (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005). As a result of ownership
personal information and knowledge are considered more important
than other's information (Chernyshenko, Miner, Baumann, & Sniezek,
2003). Subsequently, competitive decision makers, more than co-
operative decision makers, base their decision on their personal in-
formation, even when their decision would have been better if they
valued all available information equally (Toma, Bry, & Butera, 2013).
Third, competitive decision makers' focus on themselves is strongly
related to non-conformity and resistance against majority influence
(Imhoff & Erb, 2008). This attitude is different in cooperative groups,
where individuals are more likely to value the majority or the group
member with an average or median preference, and may even pressure
deviants into conformity (Janis & Mann, 1977).
Because of their focus on convincing others, strong ownership of
personal preferences, and non-conformity, individuals in competitive
groups may consider a smaller range of potentially acceptable group
decisions, which in turn could mitigate the anchoring-bias.
Accordingly, we predict that the anchoring-bias is weaker in competi-
tive groups than in cooperative groups (Hypothesis 4). With regards to
preference-driven processes we expect that competitive group members'
preferences will be less biased in the direction of the anchor than co-
operative group members' preferences (Hypothesis 5a), which will ac-
count for the expected differential susceptibility to anchors (Hypothesis
5b). Next, we expect that in cooperative groups, more than in compe-
titive groups, the median preference, rather than extreme preferences,
is more predictive of the group decision (Hypothesis 5c). With regards
to information-driven processes we expect cooperative groups to be
focused more on biased, anchor consistent information (and thus less on
inconsistent information) than competitive groups (Hypothesis 6a),
which will account for the anchoring-bias (Hypothesis 6b).
Fig. 2. Mediation Analysis of the interaction between Anchor and Process Accountability on the group sentence. Total Indirect effect is: −1.29 (0.60), CI95: –2.48 –0.10. Standard Errors
between parentheses and the direct effect of Anchor X Accountability between brackets. Estimates are based on a bootstrapping procedure with 10,000 bootstrap samples. *p < .05,
***p < .001. Used Process (Hayes, 2013) Model 8.
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8. Method
8.1. Design and participants
Hypotheses were tested in a 2 (Anchor: Low vs. High)× 2
(Motivation: Competitive vs. Cooperative) design in which participants
were randomly assigned to three-person groups and conditions. The
study received ethics approval from the local Psychology Research
Institute Ethics Review Board and participants provided informed-
consent. Because effects of competition in groups tend to be large (e.g.,
d≥ 1.15 in Toma & Butera, 2009 information exchange analyses), and
the effect-size of anchoring in (cooperative) groups was large (d ± 1
over the previous studies, requiring a total of 24 groups for an in-
dependent sample t-test at 80% power) we aimed to recruit 180 par-
ticipants for 60 groups.
Undergraduate and graduate students (N= 177, M=21.08,
SD=2.40 years; 124 women) participated for course-credit or 10 euro.
(Five groups inadvertently contained participants that participated in
the pre-test. Because of an exit-question these participants were iden-
tified and their groups were removed before any data analysis took
place. They are thus not part of the reported sample.)
8.2. Procedure and decision-making task
The procedure was similar to the procedure used in the previous two
studies. Participants read a realistic 7-page murder case on paper. As
was done previously, the case was written to ensure participants
reached a guilty verdict whereupon they could determine a sentence.
The case described the life of Anne. She felt trapped in a marriage with
Mark, her second husband who physically and mentally abused her.
Anne was afraid to leave because Mark threatened to hurt their
daughter. She confessed planning Marks murder months in advance,
and confessed to killing him in his sleep. In a pretest (N=41) 38
participants declared the defendant guilty and three indicated they did
not know.
8.3. Manipulation of anchor
The 38 participants from the pretest who declared the defendant
guilty indicated their preferred sentence (M=36.05, SD=33.69).
Based on their answers, we created a high anchor, which roughly cor-
responded with the 90th percentile, at 71 months, and a low anchor,
which corresponded with the 10th percentile, at eight months.
8.4. Manipulation of cooperative and competitive motivation
We manipulated the groups' cooperative or competitive motivation
using instructions, following procedures established in previous work
(e.g., Nijstad & Oltmanns, 2012). Group members in the competitive
condition received instructions to “try to ensure the group decision
represents your opinion”. Group members in the cooperative condition
received instructions to reach a joint, collaborative decision: “try to
reach a decision that represents all group members' opinions”. By doing
so we created differences in the alignment of member's goals. Co-
operative groups could succeed if all members gave in a bit, while in
competitive groups a shift towards one member's preferences meant a
‘loss’ for other members. All members of a group received the same
instructions. After these instructions participants answered two in-




The main dependent variable was the group sentencing judgment
(in months). As in the previous studies, prior to receiving the anchor
and manipulation, participants noted their individual sentencing pre-
ference.
8.5.2. Process measures
All group deliberations were audio-recorded, transcribed and coded.
We again recorded members' first offers and the speaking turns in which
the first offers were made. Additionally, 16 different incriminating ar-
guments and 20 exonerating arguments were coded. The arguments
were based on the pretest mentioned above (N=41) in which parti-
cipants were asked to indicate, from the case materials, as many ar-
guments in favor of a high sentence (incriminating arguments) and in
favor of a low sentence (exonerating arguments). The coding process
resulted in frequency data for all 36 arguments. As in Study 2, in-
formation-driven communication was analyzed as the proportion of
anchor-consistent/inconsistent arguments mentioned. Together, these
two variables again represent 100% of information exchange.
9. Results
9.1. Data preparation
Two groups were removed because they declared the defendant not
guilty and thus did not determine a sentence. The data of the remaining
57 groups were analyzed. There were no differences between the con-
ditions in sex composition, χ2(3)= 5.37, p= .147 and age, F
(3,167)= 1.17, p= .325, nor were there differences between condi-
tions on the mean individual pre-anchor sentences, F(3,167)= 0.89,
p= .449.
Group sentence (Hypothesis 4).
Hypothesis 4 predicted that anchors influence the group sentencing
judgment in cooperative groups but not, or to a lesser extent, in com-
petitive groups. A 2 (Anchor: High versus Low)×2 (Motivation:
Competitive versus Cooperative) ANOVA on group sentence showed
that there were no main effects of Motivation (Cooperative: M=33.67,
SD=17.97; Competitive: M=38.73, SD=27.74), F(1,53)= 0.11,
p= .743, and Anchor, F(1,53)= 0.65, p= .425 (Low anchor:
M=34.30, SD=26.75; High anchor: M=38.17, SD=20.58).
However, results revealed the expected interaction between Anchor and
Motivation, F(1,53)= 6.40, p= .014, ɳp2= 0.108, indicating that the
effect of Anchor was different for cooperative and competitive groups.
Fig. 1B shows that, as in the previous two studies, cooperative groups
were susceptible to anchoring, giving higher punishments in the high
anchor condition (M=43.50, SD=17.94) than in the low anchor
condition (M=23.08, SD=10.82), F(1,53)= 5.29, p= .025,
ɳp2= 0.091. However, there was no significant difference for compe-
titive groups (Mhigh=33.50, SD=22.13 vs. Mlow=44.71,
SD=32.86), F(1,53)= 1.57, p= .216.
9.2. Preference-driven processes
Groups made their first offers after 18.26% (SD=15%) of the
speaking turns. On average only 1.72 (SD=0.45) arguments were
mentioned before the first offer was made, thus underlining that the
first offer measure indeed captures early preference pooling in the ab-
sence of information-driven processes. Cooperative groups (M=16.44,
SD=16.78) pooled their preferences after fewer speaking turns than
competitive groups (M=27.07, SD=27.44), F(1,53)= 3.09,
p= .085, but this difference was marginally significant.
9.2.1. Biased first offers (Hypotheses 5a, b)
We analyzed whether first offers depended on anchor and motiva-
tion. A 2 (Anchor)× 2 (Motivation) ANOVA revealed that there were
no differences on first offers between cooperative (M=41.22,
SD=20.22) and competitive groups (M=45.00, SD=30.51), F
(1,53)= 0.17, p= .685, nor between the high (M=38.28,
SD=20.68) and the low Anchor conditions (M=48.69, SD=30.31),
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F(1,53)= 1.69, p= .200. Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted that com-
petitive group members' preferences would be less biased in the di-
rection of the anchor than cooperative group members' preferences, and
that this would account for the expected differential susceptibility to
anchors. In support of Hypothesis 5a, we found a significant interaction
between anchor and motivation, F(1,53)= 5.82, p= .019,
ɳp2= 0.099, indicating that competitive groups' first offers were not
biased in the direction of the anchor. In fact, they made higher first
offers in the low anchor condition (M=58.26, SD=34.42) than in the
high anchor condition (M=33.40, SD=21.57), F(1,53)= 7.26,
p= .009, ɳp2= 0.120. This was in contrast to cooperative groups,
whose mean first offers were in the direction of the anchor
(Mlow=38.38, SD=22.01 versus Mhigh=43.86, SD=18.83), al-
though this difference was not significant, F(1,53)= 0.59, p= .445.
Thus, interestingly, unlike in Study 2, we did not find clear evidence for
cooperative groups' first offers to be biased towards the anchor, but
evidence for competitive groups being biased away from the anchor.
Because there was a strong relation between first offers and group
sentence (r(57)= 0.619, p < .001) we continued with a moderated
mediation analysis (see Hayes, 2013, model 8) to check whether first
offers could account for motivation effects on the anchoring-bias. The
indirect effect through first offer (−1.59, SE=0.78) was significant
using the 95% bias corrected confidence interval (CI95: −3.39 –0.34),
which did not include zero (see Fig. 3). These results suggest that at
least part of the effect of motivation and anchor on the group sentence
was already incorporated in the first offers, which is in line with Hy-
pothesis 5b, even though the exact pattern of this data was not pre-
dicted.
9.2.2. Focus on median first offers (Hypothesis 5c)
We found that preferences in cooperative groups were as diverse as
in competitive groups, by comparing first offer variances between
conditions, F(1,52)= 0.399, p= .530. Overall, variances within groups
were large. The average difference between the minimum and the
maximum first offer was 63.70months (SD=58.81), and did not de-
pend on anchor, motivation or the interaction, Fs < 1.23, ps > 0.267.
To analyze if all groups took full advantage of this diversity of first
offer-preferences we created a regression model with the three group
members' first offers, dummy coded motivation and the interactions
between motivation and first offer as predictors and group sentence as
dependent variable. Hypothesis 5c predicted that in cooperative groups
the median group member would be most influential, because this
member represented the least extreme first offer (see Davis, 1996),
while in competitive groups all group members' first offers, including
the more extreme ones, would influence the group decision.
Our regression model resulted in a good overall fit, R2=0.73, F
(7,49)= 18.59, p < .001. We found that indeed, in cooperative groups
only the group's middle first offer predicted the group sentence
(B= 0.784, SE= 0.217, p= .001), while the lowest (B= 0.275,
SE= 0.187, p= .465) and the highest first offer did not (B= 0.057,
SE= 0.078, p= .148). In competitive groups the group's lowest
(B= 0.804, SE= 0.132, p < .001) and the highest (B= 0.168,
SE= 0.081, p= .044) first offer did influence the group sentence, while
the middle preference did not (B= 0.140, SE= 0.129, p= .282). Thus,
in cooperative groups, but not in competitive groups, the median first
offer dominates, supporting Hypothesis 5c.
9.3. Information-driven communication (Hypotheses 6a,b)
According to Hypothesis 6a cooperative groups would focus more
on biased, anchor-consistent arguments than competitive groups' dis-
cussions. Results revealed, however, that motivation did not affect the
groups' focus, F(1,53)= 2.34, p= .132 (Mcoop=0.53, SD=0.17;
Mcomp=0.46, SD=0.15) nor did Anchor, F(1,53)= 0.22, p= .638.
Thus, Hypothesis 6a received no support. Consequently, Hypothesis 6b
– which states that information exchange would account for the extent
of the anchoring-bias – was also unsupported.
10. Discussion of study 3
Study 3 replicated our finding that cooperative groups are vulner-
able to anchoring, and in addition showed that susceptibility is stronger
in cooperative than competitive groups. We observed that differential
susceptibility to anchoring is mainly due to preference-driven com-
munication. We found that competitive groups' first exchanged pre-
ferences shift away from the anchor. Arguably this can be explained by
competitive groups' strong sense of ownership (Toma, Bry, & Butera,
2013), and their reluctance to concede to other preferences. When
confronted with an unwanted anchor, competitive group members
might counter this anchor by shifting their personal preferences in the
opposite direction. Indeed, competitive groups in the low anchor con-
dition produced more extreme first offers because with the low anchor
being given, individuals only had one direction (upwards) to influence
the group.
We manipulated cooperative versus competitive motivations
through instructions, and all group members received the same in-
structions. Group members may not be given such clear-cut instructions
to reach consensual or self-serving decisions, and lacking such clear
instructions some individuals may seek consensus, and others aim for
decisions that reflect their personal interests best. Future research could
Fig. 3. Mediation Analysis of the interaction between Anchor and Motivation on the group sentence. Total Indirect effect is: −1.59 (0.78), CI95%: –3.39 –0.34. Standard Errors are
between parentheses and the direct effect of Anchor X Motivation between brackets. Estimates are based on a bootstrapping procedure with 10,000 bootstrap samples. *p < .05,
***p < .001. Used Process (Hayes, 2013) Model 8. Alternatively, one could predict an interaction between first offers and motivation on group sentence based on the results of
Hypothesis 5C. Including this interaction (Model 59) does not change conclusions.
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examine the effects of group-level heterogeneity in social preferences
and concomitant cooperative versus competitive orientations within
decision-making groups.
11. Conclusions and general discussion
Given that groups make many important numerical decisions and
judgments, it is important to determine if, and when, they are vulner-
able to the anchoring-bias. Study 1 showed that groups are influenced
by anchors. In the two following studies we investigated whether this
vulnerability to anchors could be mitigated by process accountability,
and intragroup competition. In Study 2 we manipulated groups' moti-
vation to engage in thorough information processing, by making half
the groups process accountable. We found that groups are less influ-
enced by anchors when they are process accountable than when they
are not. Results further suggested that this was due to biased preference
exchange –control groups aligned their preferences with the anchor,
while process accountable groups did not. In Study 3, half of the groups
were cooperatively motivated, while the other half were competitively
motivated. In line with our expectations, we found that competitive
groups are less influenced by anchors than cooperative groups. This was
explained by competitive groups' preferences moving away from the
anchor. In addition, we found that in cooperative groups the median
preference in the group (rather than more peripheral preferences) in-
fluenced the group's decision.
Taken together our studies show that group decision-making is
susceptible to the anchoring-bias, which fits with earlier research in-
dicating that groups are vulnerable to some of the same biases that
plague individual decision makers (Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Kerr et al.,
1996; Sunstein, 2004). In addition, we have shown that the extent of
groups' vulnerability depends on groups' cooperative or competitive
motivation, and their motivation to thoroughly process information.
That anchors influence judgments even in noisy environments, such as
group discussions, underlines the ubiquitous and robust nature of the
anchoring-bias (Klein et al., 2014). In the next section we discuss the
underlying processes, address implications for research, discuss lim-
itations of the current set of studies and offer suggestions for further
research.
11.1. Preference-driven vs. information-driven processes
To explain the group anchoring effect we predicted that anchors
influence group judgments through both preference-driven and in-
formation-driven processes. Preference-driven processes capture whe-
ther anchors influenced individual judgments before considerable
group discussion has taken place. Information-processes capture whe-
ther the group discussion is biased by the anchor. Our results show
support for a preference-driven account of group anchoring: The extent
of bias in individual preferences explain why some groups fall prey to
the anchoring-bias while others do not. In both Study 2 and 3, first
offers were overall correlated with the final group judgment. Yet, our
results were not unequivocal about the exact role biased preference
exchange plays: Whereas in Study 2, anchors biased cooperative control
groups' first offers, and this accounted for biased group judgment, in
Study 3, surprisingly, cooperative groups' first offers were unaffected by
the anchor, yet group judgment was affected by the anchors. In addi-
tion, and interestingly, when group members were competitively mo-
tivated, their preferences were biased away from the anchor, which
resulted in unbiased group decisions (Study 3). While leaving much
room for further research these results do highlight that when pre-
ferences are biased and point into one direction (regardless of which
direction), this bias is generally passed on to the group decision. This is
in line with decision-making research showing that individual pre-
ferences are highly predictive of the final group judgment (Faulmüller,
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2010; Hinsz, Tindale, &
Vollrath, 1997).
Interestingly, we found no evidence that anchors biased the con-
tents of the information that groups exchanged. This seems at odds with
research investigating the Selective Accessibility Model, which has
shown in a thought listing procedure (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999) and a
lexical decision task (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000) that anchors make
anchor-consistent information more accessible. There are at least three
explanations for the absent role of information-driven processes in our
findings. First, it may be that our measure of counting how often ex-
onerating vs. incriminating arguments were mentioned in a group dis-
cussion does not necessarily reflect accessibility very accurately.
Second, group-level argument exchange is an interactive process. As a
result, an anchor consistent argument is more likely followed by an
anchor inconsistent argument in a group setting than in an individual
setting, because a disagreeing group member might react, while an
individual might continue a train of thought. Consequently, argument
exchange in groups might be less biased than argument generation in
individuals. Third, judgment tasks like we used in our studies have no
demonstrably correct answer (Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986)
and therefore depend less on logic and truth-seeking and more on af-
fective reasoning and negotiation or haggling. Affective judgments re-
quire less systemic retrieval, encoding and processing of information
(Zajonc, 1980), making it more likely that information driven processes
might not play a key role in determining a judgment issue.
Our results further show that preferences were unbiased in process
accountable groups and biased away from the anchor in competitive
groups. These findings can be explained by psychological ownership
over ideas (Toma, Bry, & Butera, 2013), and subsequent less willingness
to assimilate towards an external anchor. People under process ac-
countability require more convincing information, and are thus more
hesitant to shift their preference early on. Such an attitude might be
related to psychological ownership (Avey, Avolio, Crossley, & Luthans,
2009). Competition induced sense of ownership is the consequence of a
key aspect of competition: Being more focused on individual than group
outcomes. Competitive group members' high sense of ownership, in
combination with a potential strategic use of a first offer (see Steinel &
De Dreu, 2004; Steinel, Utz, & Koning, 2010) might therefore have
resulted in competitive groups being biased away from the anchor.
In our studies the anchoring-bias was best explained by preference
driven processes that occurred early on in the group discussion:
Individual members' preferences influenced the group's decision, with
no clear role for group discussion and information exchange. This
highlights the individual nature of the anchoring-bias, and suggests that
rather than to speak of ‘the anchoring-bias in groups’ we should speak
of ‘the anchoring-bias in individuals operating in groups’. Future re-
search should investigate how competition and process accountability
influence the anchoring-bias in individuals (see Epley & Gilovich,
2010).
11.2. Comparison with individual decision makers
As noted at the outset, early work by others suggested that group
decisions are equally biased as individual decisions when the group
consists of members who were biased by an anchor before the group
discussion (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997). In our studies, the anchor ma-
nipulation was at the group level and following the individual in-
formation intake. To assess the extent to which the group-level an-
choring bias in our set-up differs from anchoring in individual decision-
makers, we additionally tested 47 individuals (9 men, Mage=21.32,
SD= 4.98), who were given the same case materials as used in Study 1
and 2. Participants either drew a high (61) or a low (6) lottery ticket
which represented the demand of the prosecution. After receiving the
anchor, they made a sentencing decision. One individual was excluded
for declaring the defendant not guilty.
We compared the remaining 46 individual decisions with the sen-
tencing decisions of all 96 cooperative groups from our studies (i.e. all
groups in Study 1 [N=24], (cooperative) control groups in Study 2
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[N=45], and cooperative groups in Study 3 [N=27]). In order to
make decisions comparable we standardized all decisions. A 2
(Decision-Making Entity: Individual vs. Group)× 2 (Anchor: Low vs.
High) ANOVA indicated that overall, sentencing decisions depended on
the Anchor, F(1,138)= 40.37, p < .001, ɳp2= 0.226. When in-
dividuals or groups were given low anchors, their sentences were lower
(M=−0.48, SD=0.64) than when given a high anchor (M=0.47,
SD=1.07). There was, however, no effect of decision-making entity, F
(1,138)= 0.206, p= .651, or the interaction with anchor, F
(1,138)= 0.285, p= .594. This lack of an interaction is further illu-
strated by the small difference in effect size between individual
(d= 1.04) and group decision-makers (d= 1.15).
That individuals are as influenced by anchoring as cooperative
groups raises the question whether the key finding that groups judg-
ments are influenced by anchoring can be explained by a simple ag-
gregate of individual (biased) judgments, or whether group processes
are uniquely contributing to anchoring in group judgment and decision-
making. To some extent indeed, our findings suggest that group inter-
action – including the pooling of preferences and the exchange of ar-
guments – neither reduces nor amplifies individually held bias. At the
very least, our findings suggest that also groups are susceptible to an-
choring and that socio-contextual influences, such as the cooperative
versus competitive incentive structure within groups, moderates such
anchoring. Yet our findings also suggest that anchoring bias in groups is
the result of an implicit, and arguably fast, negotiation among group
members. Such negotiation takes place in a heuristic fashion, with
members settling on an easy middle-of-the-road solution. This seems to
happen in cooperative groups; in competitive groups, preference-
pooling was less obvious and individual positions were arguably de-
fended more fiercely. This points to the possibility that anchoring bias
in group-decision making may be the aggregate of individual biases, but
also reflects the bargaining power of specific individuals within the
group. Future research could invest in further uncovering such social
construction of anchoring bias by examining, for example, whether and
how status and leadership positions influence group-level anchoring.
Related to this question is that our findings pertain, as mentioned, to
group tasks in which objective, verifiable solutions were missing. It is
precisely in such settings that individuals are susceptible to social influ-
ence and need consensual decision-making rather than a “truth-wins”
procedure; (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). Typically, groups perform better than
individuals in such intellective tasks, as “two-heads-are-better-than-one”
and anchoring bias may be, accordingly, substantially reduced (Laughlin
et al., 1998). Future studies could include problems that are more in-
tellective in order to establish group-level anchoring in these tasks.
12. Conclusion
Groups are often tasked with making important decisions, after all,
“two heads know more than one”, and multiple heads might be able to
avoid groups falling prey to influential decision making biases, such as
anchoring. Given that anchors are everywhere – from a restaurant name
(Critcher & Gilovich, 2008) to subliminal primes (Mussweiler &
Englich, 2005; Reitsma-van Rooijen & Dancker, 2006) – the potential
impact on group decision-making is large. Indeed, across three studies
we found groups can be vulnerable to the anchoring-bias. Especially in
the absence of accountability and competitive incentives, groups give
higher sentences when presented with a high anchor than with a low
anchor. Such anchoring effects emerge because of preference-pooling
rather than biased information processing during group discussions.
Making decisions cooperatively in a group is no antidote for the an-
choring-bias.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.02.001.
References
Avey, J. B., Avolio, B. J., Crossley, C. D., & Luthans, F. (2009). Psychological ownership:
Theoretical extensions, measurement and relation to work outcomes. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 30, 173–191.
Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2005). Conflict's consequences: Effects of social motives
on postnegotiation creative and convergent group functioning and performance.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 358–374.
Brewer, N. T., & Chapman, G. B. (2002). The fragile basic anchoring effect. Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, 15, 65–77.
Chapman, G., & Johnson, E. (1999). Anchoring, activation, and the construction of va-
lues. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79, 115–153.
Chaxel, A.-S. (2014). The impact of procedural priming of selective accessibility on self-
generated and experimenter-provided anchors. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 50, 45–51.
Chernyshenko, O. S., Miner, A. G., Baumann, M. R., & Sniezek, J. A. (2003). The impact of
information distribution, ownership, and discussion on group member judgment: The
differential cue weighting model. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 91, 12–25.
Critcher, C. R., & Gilovich, T. (2008). Incidental environmental anchors. Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, 251, 241–251.
Davis, J. H. (1973). Group decision and social interaction: A theory of social decision
schemes. Psychological Review, 80, 97–125.
Davis, J. H. (1996). Group decision making and quantitative judgments: A consensus
model. In E. Witte, & J. H. Davis (Vol. Eds.), Consensual action by small groups: . Vol. 1.
Understanding group behavior (pp. 35–59). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.
Davis, J. H., Stasser, G., Spitzer, C. E., & Holt, R. W. (1976). Changes in group members'
decision preferences during discussion: An illustration with mock juries. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 1177–1187.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Beersma, B., Stroebe, K., & Euwema, M. C. (2006). Motivated in-
formation processing, strategic choice, and the quality of negotiated agreement.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 927–943.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Koole, S. L., & Steinel, W. (2000). Unfixing the fixed pie: A motivated
information-processing approach to integrative negotiation. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 79, 975–987.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Nijstad, B. A., & Van Knippenberg, D. (2008). Motivated information
processing in group judgment and decision making. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 12, 22–49.
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Knippenberg, D. (2005). The possessive self as a barrier to
conflict resolution: Effects of mere ownership, process accountability, and self-con-
cept clarity on competitive cognitions and behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 89, 345–357.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on
integrative negotiation: A meta-analytic review and test of two theories. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 889–905.
Englich, B., Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2006). Playing dice with criminal sentences: The
influence of irrelevant anchors on experts' judicial decision making. Personality &
Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 188–200.
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2001). Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjust-
ment heuristic: Differential processing of self-generated and experimenter-provided
anchors. Psychological Science, 12, 391–396.
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2005). When effortful thinking influences judgmental an-
choring: Differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self-generated and ex-
ternally provided anchors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 199–212.
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2006). The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the ad-
justments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311–318.
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2010). Anchoring unbound. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20,
20–24.
Faulmüller, N., Kerschreiter, R., Mojzisch, A., & Schulz-Hardt, S. (2010). Beyond group-
level explanations for the failure of groups to solve hidden profiles: The individual
preference effect revisited. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13, 653–671.
Furnham, A., & Boo, H. C. (2011). A literature review of the anchoring effect. The Journal
of Socio-Economics, 40, 35–42.
Galinsky, A., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-
taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 657–669.
Gigone, D., & Hastie, R. (1993). The common knowledge effect: Information sharing and
group judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 959–974.
Hackman, J. R. (1998). Why teams don't work. In R. S. Tindale, L. Heath, J. Edwards, E.
Posavac, F. Bryant, Y. Suarez-Balcazar, & J. Eaaron Henderson-King (Eds.). Theory
and research on small groups (pp. 245–267). New York: Plenum Press.
Hastie, R., Penrod, S., & Pennington, N. (1983). Inside the jury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis:
A regression-based approach. New York: Guilford Press.
Hinsz, V. B., Tindale, R. S., & Vollrath, D.a. (1997). The emerging conceptualization of
groups as information processors. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 43–64.
Imhoff, R., & Erb, H.-P. (2008). What motivates nonconformity? Uniqueness seeking
blocks majority influence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 309–320.
Jacowitz, K. E., & Kahneman, D. (1995). Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1161–1166.
Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice
and commitment. New York: Free Press.
Kerr, N. L., MacCoun, R. J., & Kramer, G. P. (1996). Bias in judgment: Comparing in-
dividuals and groups. Psychological Review, 103, 687–719.
T.R.W. de Wilde et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 76 (2018) 116–126
125
Kerr, N. L., & Tindale, R. S. (2004). Group performance and decision making. Annual
Review of Psychology, 55, 623–655.
Klein, R. A., Ratliff, K. A., Vianello, M., Adams, R. B., Bahník, Š., Bernstein, M. J., ...
Nosek, B. A. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability: A “many labs” replication
project. Social Psychology, 45, 142–152.
Laughlin, P. R. (1980). Social combination processes of cooperative problem-solving
groups on verbal intellective tasks. Progress in Social Psychology, 1, 127–155.
Laughlin, P. R., Bonner, B. L., & Altermatt, T. W. (1998). Collective versus individual
induction with single versus multiple hypotheses. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 75, 1481–1489.
Laughlin, P. R., & Earley, P. C. (1982). Social combination models, persuasive arguments
theory, social comparison theory, and choice shift. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 42, 273–280.
Laughlin, P. R., & Ellis, A. L. (1986). Demonstrability and social combination processes on
mathematical intellective tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22,
177–189.
Laughlin, P. R., VanderStoep, S. W., & Hollingshead, A. B. (1991). Collective versus in-
dividual induction: Recognition of truth, rejection of error, and collective information
processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 50–67.
Lerner, J., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability.
Psychological Bulletin, 125, 255–275.
Loschelder, D. D., Friese, M., Schaerer, M., & Galinsky, A. D. (2016). The too-much-
precision effect. Psychological Science, 27, 1573–1587.
Loschelder, D. D., Trötschel, R., Swaab, R. I., Friese, M., & Galinsky, A. D. (2016). The
information-anchoring model of first offers: When moving first helps versus hurts
negotiators. Journal of Applied Psychology, 101, 995–1012.
Minson, J. A., & Mueller, J. S. (2012). The cost of collaboration: Why joint decision
making exacerbates rejection of outside information. Psychological Science, 23,
219–224.
Minson, J. A., & Mueller, J. S. (2013). Groups weight outside information less than in-
dividuals do, although they shouldn't: Response to Schulze, Mojzisch, and Schulz-
Hardt (2013). Psychological Science, 24, 1373–1374.
Mussweiler, T., & Englich, B. (2005). Subliminal anchoring: Judgmental consequences
and underlying mechanisms. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
98, 133–143.
Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (1999). Hypothesis-consistent testing and semantic priming in
the anchoring paradigm: A selective accessibility model. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 35, 136–164.
Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2000). Numeric judgments under uncertainty: The role of
knowledge in anchoring. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 495–518.
Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2001). The semantics of anchoring. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 86, 234–255.
Nijstad, B. A., & Oltmanns, J. (2012). Motivated information processing and group de-
cision refusal. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 15, 637–651.
Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1987). Experts, amateurs, and real estate: An anchoring-
and-adjustment perspective on property pricing decisions. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 39, 84–97.
Patalano, A., & LeClair, Z. (2011). The influence of group decision making on indeci-
siveness-related decisional confidence. Judgment and Decision making, 6, 163–175.
Reitsma-van Rooijen, M., & Dancker, D. D. (2006). Subliminal anchoring: The effects of
subliminally presented numbers on probability estimates. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 42, 380–387.
Schaerer, M., Loschelder, D. D., & Swaab, R. I. (2016). Bargaining zone distortion in
negotiations: The elusive power of multiple alternatives. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 137, 156–171.
Schaerer, M., Swaab, R. I., & Galinsky, A. D. (2015). Anchors weigh more than power.
Psychological Science, 26, 170–181.
Scholten, L., van Knippenberg, D., Nijstad, B. A., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2007). Motivated
information processing and group decision-making: Effects of process accountability
on information processing and decision quality. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 43, 539–552.
Schultze, T., Mojzisch, A., & Schulz-Hardt, S. (2013). Groups weight outside information
less than individuals do because they should: Response to Minson and Mueller
(2012). Psychological Science, 24, 1371–1372.
Schulz-Hardt, S., Brodbeck, F. C., Mojzisch, A., Kerschreiter, R., & Frey, D. (2006). Group
decision making in hidden profile situations: Dissent as a facilitator for decision
quality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 1080–1093.
Siegel-Jacobs, K., & Yates, J. (1996). Effects of procedural and outcome accountability on
judgment quality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65, 1–17.
Simmons, J. P., LeBoeuf, R. A., & Nelson, L. D. (2010). The effect of accuracy motivation
on anchoring and adjustment: Do people adjust from provided anchors? Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 917–932.
Sniezek, J. A. (1992). Groups under uncertainty: An examination of confidence in group
decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 52, 124–155.
Stanne, M. B., Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (1999). Does competition enhance or
inhibit motor performance: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 133–154.
Stasser, G., & Birchmeier, Z. (2003). Group creativity and collective choice. In P. B.
Paulus, & B. A. Nijstad (Eds.). Group creativity: Innovation through collaboration (pp.
85–109). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group decision
making: Biased information sampling during discussion. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 48, 1467–1478.
Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1987). Effects of information load and percentage of shared
information on the dissemination of unshared information during group discussion.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 81–93.
Steinel, W., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2004). Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in
social decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 419–434.
Steinel, W., Utz, S., & Koning, L. (2010). The good, the bad and the ugly thing to do when
sharing information: Revealing, concealing and lying depend on social motivation,
distribution and importance of information. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 113, 85–96.
Stewart, N. (2009). The cost of anchoring on credit-card minimum repayments.
Psychological Science, 20, 39–41.
Strack, F., Mussweiler, T., Danneil, W., Deppe, U., Fritze, G., Harneit, C., ... Sequeira, A.
(1997). Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms of selective accessi-
bility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 437–446.
Sunstein, C. R. (2004). Group judgments: Deliberation, statistical means, and information
markets. (No. 219).
Switzer, F. S., & Sniezek, J. A. (1991). Judgment processes in motivation: Anchoring and
adjustment effects on judgment and behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 49, 208–229.
Ten Velden, F. S., Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010). It takes one to tango: The
effects of dyads' epistemic motivation composition in negotiation. Personality & Social
Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1454–1466.
Tetlock, P. E. (1992). The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: Toward a
social contingency model. In M. P. Zanna (Vol. Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology. Vol. 25. Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 331–376). San
Diego: Academic Press.
Thorsteinson, T. J., Breier, J., Atwell, A., Hamilton, C., & Privette, M. (2008). Anchoring
effects on performance judgments. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 107, 29–40.
Tindale, R. S., Kameda, T., & Hinsz, V. B. (2003). Group decision making. Sage Handbook
of Social Psychology, 381–403.
Toma, C., Bry, C., & Butera, F. (2013). Because i'm worth it! (more than others ...). Social
Psychology, 44, 248–255.
Toma, C., & Butera, F. (2009). Hidden profiles and concealed information: Strategic in-
formation sharing and use in group decision making. Personality & Social Psychology
Bulletin, 35, 793–806.
Toma, C., Vasiljevic, D., Oberlé, D., & Butera, F. (2013). Assigned experts with compe-
titive goals withhold information in group decision making. The British Journal of
Social Psychology, 52, 161–172.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.
Science, 185, 1124–1131 (New York, N.Y.).
Wansink, B., Kent, R., & Hoch, S. (1998). An anchoring and adjustment model of purchase
quantity decisions. Journal of Marketing Research, 35, 71–81.
Wegener, D. T., Petty, R. E., Blankenship, K. L., & Detweiler-Bedell, B. (2010). Elaboration
and numerical anchoring: Breadth, depth, and the role of (non-)thoughtful processes
in anchoring theories. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20, 28–32.
Whyte, G. (1993). Escalating commitment in individual and group decision making: A
prospect theory approach. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 54,
430–455.
Whyte, G., & Sebenius, J. K. (1997). The effect of multiple anchors on anchoring in in-
dividual and group judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
69, 75–85.
Winquist, J. R., & Larson, J. R. J. (1998). Information pooling: When it impacts group
decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 371–377.
Wittenbaum, G. M., Hollingshead, A. B., & Botero, I. C. (2004). From cooperative to
motivated information sharing in groups: Moving beyond the hidden profile para-
digm. Communication Monographs, 71, 286–310.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking–preferences need no inferences. American
Psychologist, 35, 151–175.
T.R.W. de Wilde et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 76 (2018) 116–126
126
